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Abstract
We compare earnings inequality and mobility across the U.S., Canada, France,
Germany and the U.K. during the late 1990s. A ﬂexible model of earnings dy-
namics that isolates positional mobility within a stable earnings distribution is
estimated. Earnings trajectories are then simulated, and lifetime annuity value
distributions are constructed. Earnings mobility and employment risk are found
to be positively correlated with base-year inequality. Taken together they pro-
duce more equalization in countries with high cross-section inequality such that
the countries in our sample have more similar lifetime inequality levels than cross-
section measures suggest.
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1 Introduction
Because individuals are subject to shocks that change and exchange their positions
within earnings distributions, cross-sectional survey data oﬀers an incomplete pic-
ture of earnings inequality across countries or diﬀerent groups within the same
country. In order to account for such sources of instability as employment risk
and earnings mobility, it is essential to consider long-run measures of earnings
inequality. Earnings mobility that occurs within a stable earnings distribution is
an equalizing force across individuals and thus leads to lower lifetime inequality.
Hence, a comparison of long-run inequality measures to current or base-year in-
equality measures reveals the degree of equalization mobility in each country. If
countries with high levels of current inequality exhibit a large amount of equal-
ization mobility, then cross-country comparisons of current inequality overstate
long-run diﬀerences. If the opposite is true, any long-run diﬀerences are under-
stated.
In this paper we study cross-country diﬀerences in current and lifetime earn-
ings inequality for the U.S., Canada, the U.K., France and Germany. These coun-
tries showcase both a range of earnings inequality levels and a range of earnings
mobility and employment risk patterns leading to diﬀerences in lifetime inequality
levels. Diﬀerences in institutions and labour market policies across these coun-
tries have been linked to diﬀerences in current inequality (e.g. minimum wage
policies). The same diﬀerences can also result in mobility diﬀerences and, subse-
quently, diﬀerences in lifetime inequality. The OECD Employment Outlook 2004
provides a precise description of cross-country diﬀerences in employment protec-
tion regulation and wage-setting institutions, and their eﬀects on labour market
performance. It ﬁnds that stricter employment protection legislation is associated
with lower unemployment inﬂow and outﬂow rates. It also shows that our cho-
sen countries exhibit signiﬁcant variation in the strictness of their employment
protection legislation with the U.S., the U.K. and Canada at the bottom of the
index and France and Germany near the top.
Here we do not attempt to model institutional diﬀerences across the coun-
tries nor the behavioural responses of individuals to them. Instead we take as
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given that these diﬀerences are part of what generates the observed diﬀerences
in earnings and mobility patterns across these countries, and develop a statisti-
cal framework that replicates these patterns. We then use the estimates from the
statistical model to generate lifetime earnings distributions, and examine whether
these diﬀerences also lead to diﬀerences in lifetime inequality.
As discussed in MaCurdy (2007), there are two sources of variation in earn-
ings data: (1) macroeconomic dynamics that govern changes in the cross-sectional
distribution over time, and (2) microeconomic dynamics that govern individuals'
relative positions within a stable cross-sectional distribution over consecutive pe-
riods. The ﬁrst type of mobility, labeled structural mobility by MaCurdy, is
related to changes in the earnings distribution due to business cycle ﬂuctuations
or growth. The second type of mobility concerns movements within a stable dis-
tribution, and is labelled by MaCurdy as positional mobility. Since structural
mobility diﬀers across countries, it is important to isolate positional mobility
when assessing the degree of equalization across countries.
Long-run earnings inequality studies are usually based on measures of per-
manent income obtained by averaging observed earnings series. This has the
drawback of mixing structural and positional mobility. An alternative is to spec-
ify a dynamic earnings model that explicitly models both sources of mobility.
For example, complex factor models with time-varying factor loadings are used
such that diﬀerent earnings components have diﬀerent calendar-time dynamics.1
Both of these approaches require lengthy panel data sets. Since only a few coun-
tries have collected long panel data sets, the number of cross-country studies of
earnings mobility and long-run earnings inequality is small relative to the large
literature comparing cross-section earnings inequality across countries.2 Our idea
1See MaCurdy (2007) for a survey, and the particular examples of Moﬃtt and Gottschalk
(1995, 2002), Baker (1997), Haider (2001), Baker and Solon (2003), Geweke and Keane (2000,
2007), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), Browning et al. (2009), Altonji et al. (2007) and Pavan
(2008).
2Examples of comparative studies of mobility include the following. Aaberge et al. (2002)
compare the U.S. and Scandinavian countries. Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin and Rhody (1997),
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is to use suﬃciently short panels so as to mitigate the problem of structural
mobility and have the advantage of bringing more countries into the comparison.
Thus the goal of this paper is to develop a model of earnings dynamics that
uses short panels for estimation to reduce, if not eliminate, structural change;
that is ﬂexible enough to fully capture positional earnings mobility and employ-
ment risk; and that allows for the simulation of lifetime earnings and thus the
calculation of equalization mobility across countries. Because the panels are short
our model does not capture unobserved heterogeneity fully. Our response is to
provide estimates from two models - one that overestimates positional mobility
by neglecting unobserved heterogeneity and one that underestimates position mo-
bility by allowing for individual ﬁxed eﬀects.3 The actual amount of equalization
mobility for each country is then in between the two measures.
Our model incorporates the main feature of dynamic earnings models in that
it has the familiar factor structure with a deterministic component, a perma-
nent component, and a transitory, covariance-stationary component. It diﬀers,
however, on three dimensions. First, the permanent component is a standard
ﬁxed eﬀect. Thus, it allows for very little unobserved heterogeneity compared to
Browning et al. (2009), Altonji et al. (2007) and Pavan (2008). Second, the tran-
sitory component is only ﬁrst-order Markov and much simpler than, for example,
the ARCH process in Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). However, because we model
the transitory component in a very ﬂexible way, we do not impose any undue sym-
metry on the transition process. Thus our model is closer to the more traditional
Burkhauser and Poupore (1997), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), and Schluter and Trede (2003)
compare the U.S. and Germany. Van Kerm (2004) compares Belgium, Western-Germany and
the U.S. Buchinsky et al. (2003), Fields (2009), Cohen (1999) and Cohen and Dupas (2000)
study France and the U.S. Italy and the U.S. are compared by Flinn (2002). For cross-country
comparisons of earnings inequality see the surveys of Levy and Murnane(1992), Katz and Autor
(1999) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000).
3The OLS estimator of the autoregressive coeﬃcient of an AR(1) panel data model is up-
ward biased (positive correlation between the regressor and the error) and the Within-Group
estimator is biased toward zero (as in a measurement error problem).
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earnings mobility literature (e.g. Gottschalk 1997; Buchinsky and Hunt 1999).
Finally, we explicitly model employment risk rather than excluding unemployed
individuals or treating unemployment income as part of the earnings distribution.
Our main results are as follows. First, our model captures the data well,
including transitions in the tails of the earnings distributions. Second, the U.S.
displays the most positional earnings mobility with the U.K. second followed
by Canada, Germany and France. Third, the U.S. also displays more employ-
ment mobility followed closely by the U.K. and Canada. France and Germany
display far less employment mobility than the other countries. Fourth, lifetime
inequality measures that incorporate only positional earnings mobility result in
the same cross-country inequality rankings with the U.S. displaying the most
inequality. Fifth, the inclusion of employment risk brings the countries closer
together because it is an equalizing factor in the U.S., the U.K. and Canada and
a non-equalizing factor in France and Germany. Thus, despite large diﬀerences
in earnings inequality in 1998, overall the countries display more similar lifetime
inequality levels.
Our use of simulation methods to construct lifetime earnings proﬁles to es-
timate long-run inequality is related to Flinn (2002), Bowlus and Robin (2004)
and Bonhomme and Robin (2008), Cohen (1999), and Cohen and Dupas (2000).
Flinn (2002), Bowlus and Robin (2004) and Cohen (1999) use search frameworks
to model earnings dynamics. In contrast, our model is considerably more ﬂexible
because it is not restricted by the stringent implications of search theory and
it allows for unobserved heterogeneity. Bonhomme and Robin (2008) also move
away from search theory and use parametric copulas to model earnings dynamics.
They show that the parametric choice of the copula matters for the decomposi-
tion of the variance of earnings into permanent and transitory components. This
ﬁnding motivates our adoption of a semiparametric model for the dynamics of
earnings ranks. In addition, Bonhomme and Robin (2008) use a random-eﬀect
approach to unobserved heterogeneity. This renders inference diﬃcult.4 For this
4The extreme nonlinearity of the mixture model makes the estimation numerically tricky.
Bonhomme and Robin (2008) use a sequential EM algorithm in a pseudo-maximum likelihood
estimation approach. However, Flinn (2002) reports that he tried to introduce a random eﬀect
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paper, we estimate a ﬁxed eﬀect for each individual, which is much simpler but
requires more data for consistency. Finally, Bowlus and Robin (2004) and Bon-
homme and Robin (2008) study the dynamics of inequality and mobility in a
single country, while Flinn (2002), Cohen (1999) and Cohen and Dupas (2000)
compare two countries. One contribution of this paper is to conduct an inter-
national comparison of long-run earnings inequality across more countries, thus
oﬀering a more comprehensive picture of the eﬀect of labour market institutions
on long-run inequality.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section develops a theoretical
framework for computing lifetime earnings. The data and the ﬁt of the model are
discussed in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the results and conclusions are given
in Section 5.
2 The Model
2.1 Earnings Distribution Speciﬁcation
To isolate the dynamics of individual positions within marginal earnings distri-
butions separately from the dynamics of the marginal distributions themselves
we remove any structural variation by regressing log earnings on time dummies
interacted with education dummies with 1998 as the control year. It is fairly
standard to use time dummies to control for structural mobility (see MaCurdy
2007). We did experiment with time eﬀects interacted with experience groups and
time eﬀects in the variance function as well as the mean function, but found that
we were able to remove the macroeconomic eﬀects with time dummies interacted
with education and in the mean function only. The short nature of the panel data
renders a more sophisticated time-series process unnecessary. We then treat the
ﬁltered data as if all remaining dynamics reﬂect only positional mobility.
Let wht denote the earnings with the time eﬀects removed for an employed
in his model but his ML estimator failed to converge.
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worker h at time t. Next, we posit a linear regression for log earnings
lnwht = xhtβ + fh + eht, (1)
where xht is a vector of regressors comprising education dummies interacted fully
with a quartic function of potential experience.5 We allow (or not, for comparison)
for an individual ﬁxed eﬀect fh. Here we follow a Mincerian earnings regression
approach by including only education and experience as explanatory variables.6
This is a standard approach for the earnings equation in the mobility literature
(see Altonji et al. 2007; Buchinsky and Hunt 1999; Pavan 2008). Altonji et al.
and Pavan are also able to include employer tenure in their earnings regressions.
Unfortunately not all of our data sets collect information on tenure. Thus we are
not able to include this human capital component.
In the version of the model without ﬁxed eﬀects we estimate the model using
OLS. The ﬁxed eﬀect model is estimated using a ﬁxed eﬀect regression model
where time invariant regressors such as education are subsumed into the ﬁxed
eﬀect. We also allow for conditional heteroskedasticity of the following form
Var (eht|xht) = xhtγ, (2)
where the parameter vector γ is estimated by regressing the squared residuals ê2ht
on xht. To improve eﬃciency, we then re-estimate β and fh by weighted least
squares, with weights proportional to (xhtγ̂)
−1/2 (feasible GLS procedure).
5Note that we cannot allow β to depend on time as β is a parameter in the model used to
simulate long term earnings trajectories.
6Gender is also included by estimating the model separately for males and females. Race is
not included because it is not available in all of the data sets, but is controlled for in the ﬁxed
eﬀect model.
7
2.2 Transitions
Standard ARIMA models of earnings dynamics typically require only a few pa-
rameters and, therefore, characterize changes in earnings means and variances
well but fail to produce a good description of mobility in the tails of the distri-
butions (tail dependence). For example, earnings decreases (increases) should be
more likely when one is at the top (bottom) of the earnings distribution rather
than movements up and down being equally likely regardless of placement in the
distribution. Thus, it is thus important to allow for non-symmetric dynamics.
We adopt the common practice of examining matrices of transition probabilities
across deciles (e.g. Buchinsky and Hunt 1999).
Let G be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standardized resid-
uals, uht = eht /
√
xhtγ. We estimate G by the empirical cdf of ûht = êht /
√
xhtγ̂.
Let rht = G (uht) be the rank of the residual uht in the distribution G. We esti-
mate rht by r̂ht = Ĝ (ûht). Finally, let qht denote a discrete version of the ranks
rht,
qht = max
{bNrhtc+ 1
N
, 1
}
, (3)
where b·c is the integer part function. Note that qht is never equal to 0. Hence,
we use the notation qht = 0, if individual h is unemployed at time t. We call the
state the value of qht in {0, 1/N, 2/N, ..., 1}. In the empirical analysis N is set
equal to 10.
Incorporating transitions between employment and unemployment is nonstan-
dard in the earnings dynamics literature. However, employment risk has been
shown to be an important component of variation in earnings and lifetime in-
equality (see Bowlus and Robin 2004; Altonji et al. 2007; Pavan 2007). In
addition the wide variation in employment risk across countries makes a diﬀer-
ence in cross-country comparisons. Thus, we include unemployment as a state in
our transition matrix in order to incorporate employment risk in our analysis.
Because of small sample sizes for some of our countries we parameterize the
transition matrix rather than clustering the data and non-parametrically esti-
mating the transition probabilities. The latter leads to partitioning the data too
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ﬁnely and zero probability events. Thus one would be left with large clusters
to avoid this problem. Let P (i, j|xht) be the probability of moving from state
qht = i at time t to state qh,t+1 = j at time t + 1, with
∑
j P (i, j|xht) = 1. We
parameterize the transition probabilities P (i, j|xht) using multinomial logits for
each initial state i.7 Speciﬁcally,
P (i, j|xht) = exp[xhtκ(i, j)]∑N
m=0 exp[xhtκ(i,m)]
. (4)
The set of covariates includes an experience quadratic and the education dummies.
We would prefer to include more explanatory variables as well as interactions
between the variables. However, small sample sizes within these clusters prevent
the estimation of a full set of transition probabilities.
Even with a limited set of covariates some destination cell sizes are too
small, e.g. destination quantiles distant from the quantile interval of origin.
Here we collapse infrequent destination quantiles together. Speciﬁcally, upper
and lower destination deciles are combined by collapsing all destination deciles
[(j − 1)/10, j/10] such that |j − i| > k, for some k, where [(i− 1)/10, i/10] is
the decile of origin. In the empirical analysis only the U.S. has a large enough
sample size and mobility levels such that the full 11 by 11 transition matrix can
be recovered using the multinomial logit speciﬁcation. For Canada, the U.K. and
Germany, k was set equal to 3, while for France a less restrictive formulation was
able to be used such that k = 4.8
7The multinomial logit speciﬁcation is restrictive only insofar as it assumes a single index
model for the eﬀect of covariates xht on each transition probability. The recourse to linear
indices is the only practical way of dealing with the curse of dimensionality in nonparametric
estimation.
8We did conduct an experiment on the U.S. data of setting k = 4. We found the life-
time inequality measures were slightly smaller when the cells were collapsed, because the rank
placement method is now responsible for placement within the collapsed deciles rather than
the multinomial logit models. Consequently, individuals are less likely to end up in the actual
destination decile if it is at the top or bottom of the distribution.
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Having produced an approximation of the joint distribution of ranks at times t
and t+1 given covariates xht at discrete nodes, we then obtain an approximation
over the whole range of rank values by using a nearest neighbor procedure (i.e.
the matching estimator of the treatment eﬀect literature). Given rht and xht we
predict the quantile at t + 1, qh,t+1, using the multinomial logit models. Then
we predict rh,t+1 as the value of rh,t+1 in the data that yields the closest match
of rht and qh,t+1. In this way we do not impose the common assumption in the
literature of random placement within deciles and instead preserve the within
decile transition patterns. In the Appendix we provide a comparison of the ﬁt
of the earnings dynamics using two alternative strategies: random assignment
within the destination decile and rank assignment within the destination decile.
The latter refers to an individual maintaining the rank he held in the initial decile
in the destination decile. Our chosen nearest neighbor method has the best overall
ﬁt of the within decile earnings dynamics compared to the two alternatives. In
particular, it does a good job of ﬁtting the dynamics in the tails of the earnings
distribution.
One aspect of the earnings data we do not model is measurement error. In
general validation studies of wage and earnings data ﬁnd that measurement er-
ror is nonclassical and mean reverting (Bound et al. (2001) and Gottschalk and
Huynh (2007)). While classical measurement error overstates inequality, nonclas-
sical measurement error understates inequality. In terms of earnings mobility the
eﬀect of nonclassical measurement error is less clear. Evidence from Gottschalk
and Huynh using data from the U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participa-
tion (SIPP) matched to U.S. tax records (assumed to be measured without error)
indicates that the eﬀects of nonclassical measurement error are largely oﬀsetting
when examining earnings mobility. That is, estimates of the correlation in earn-
ings over time from the SIPP are found to be similar to estimates from the tax
records. Since we do not have access to validation data for each country nor
an identiﬁcation strategy for estimating the form and/or degree of measurement
error, we do not attempt to incorporate measurement error into our model. We
recognize that our measures of earnings inequality may understate the true levels,
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but we expect the reporting biases to be similar across the countries and we are
encouraged by Gottschalk and Huynh's ﬁnding that our mobility measures may
not be biased.
2.3 Simulation of the Value Functions
Bowlus and Robin (2004) computed both ex ante and ex post lifetime income
values with the former based on taking expectations or averaging over expected
future transition paths and the latter based on a single simulated path for each
individual in the sample. Here we adopt the ex post measure of lifetime income
values as our unit of analysis, but in the Appendix we provide the results for the
ex ante measure. The cross-country comparison results are the same for the two
measures. Averaging simulated paths to compute the ex ante values, as expected,
produces lower levels of lifetime inequality than the ex post measure. This is
particularly true for the model without the ﬁxed eﬀect. The model with the ﬁxed
eﬀect produces virtually identical ex ante and ex post lifetime inequality levels.
This is because the ﬁxed eﬀects already contain the average component that is
captured in the ex ante measure.
To simulate an individual's remaining path from some date t onward we start
with the current (observed) employment state and salary. Next, we randomly
draw a sequence of states for the periods following t until retirement based on
potential experience and other personal characteristics using the same marginal
distribution G and transition probability matrix P . So doing, we allow the indi-
vidual's age to change and modify the earnings process but the macroeconomic
environment responsible for shifts in G and P is held ﬁxed in its state at time t.
While employed, individuals receive the annualized value of their earnings.
Since we also include employment risk, we need to determine unemployment in-
come. Here we incorporate some cross-country diﬀerences in the unemployment
insurance systems but certainly not to the fullest extent possible given data lim-
itations. We allow for income to change over an unemployment spell to capture
the fact that unemployment insurance replacement rates decline with the dura-
tion of unemployment. To capture cross-country variation in generosity during
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unemployment we also allow the replacement rate levels to vary. Thus income
during unemployment is equal to a country-speciﬁc replacement rate ρ times the
previous period's annual earnings if the individual was working in the previous
period and times a minimum earnings level, w, if the individual was unemployed
in the previous period. Because our income measure is gross earnings, we use
gross unemployment insurance replacement rates. The rates come from Martin
(1996) and were computed by the OECD in 1995 for an individual with a spouse
at work. We use the values for the ﬁrst year of unemployment which are: 25%
for the U.S., 18% for the U.K., 54% for Canada, 58% for France and 35% for
Germany.
Finally, we set income following retirement at age a equal to 0. We do not
model diﬀerences in social security systems. Instead we take the stance that, if
retirement income is paid out of earnings through taxes or self-ﬁnancing, then
retirement income is 0 under an actuarially fair system.
Let Eat(w) be the discounted sum of the predicted future income stream for
someone with age a and earnings w at time t. To compare present values across all
individuals, not only those within the same cohort, we compute the annuity value
of employment rather than the stock value. To convert stock values Ea(w) into
annuity values we use the standard formula for an annuity Aat(w) with interest
rate r such that:
Aat(w) = Eat(w)∑a−a+1
t=1
1
(1+r)t
= rEat(w) (1 + r)
a−a+1
(1 + r)a−a+1 − 1 . (5)
In the empirical analysis r is set equal to an annual rate of 5%.
3 Data and Model Fit
3.1 Data Description
In this section we provide a brief overview of the data. A full description of
the data sets is in the Appendix. We examine data from the U.S., the U.K.,
France, Germany and Canada. The inequality analysis below examines the year
1998 with all of the countries having at least three-year panel data sets that
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cover the late 1990's. For the U.S. we use the four-year wave of the SIPP from
1996-1999. For France we use the three-year panel from the French Labor Force
Survey (LFS) for 1997-1999. The six-year 1996-2001 wave of the Survey of Labour
and Income Dynamics (SLID) is used for Canada. Finally, we use The British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the U.K. and the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) for Germany. For these latter countries we use seven years of
data from 1995-2001.9
We chose these data sets to make the samples as consistent across the countries
as possible. Three of the ﬁve data sets are part of the Cross-National Equivalent
File (CNEF) - BHPS, GSOEP and SLID. France does not have a data set in the
CNEF, but the French LFS has a similar structure to the other panels. The US
does have a data set in the CNEF, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
We chose the SIPP over the PSID, because the PSID is biennial in the late 1990's
and the SIPP's sample size is more than 4 times larger.
For every year an individual is in each panel we collect information on the
labour market state at the time of the survey, earnings if employed, education,
potential experience, and gender. We impose minimal restrictions to remove
those individuals who not active in the labour market, self-employed or in the
military. Because of outliers due to erroneous earnings observations, all of the
data sets need to be trimmed. We trim earnings at the top and bottom for
each sex*education group such that mean earnings reﬂect each group's relative
position in the market. Rather than imposing ﬁxed minimum and maximum levels
for each education group, we determine the upper (lower) trim level needed in
each country that produced maximum (minimum) and mean values that increased
with education, reduced the large amount of kurtosis in the data, and implied
plausible maximum (minimum) hourly wages. A upper trim level of 1% was
suﬃcient for all countries except Canada which needed 2%. A lower trim of only
9The sample sizes of the BHPS and GSOEP are quite small. To increase the sample size and
reveal the full transition matrix we use a longer time period. However, we do not use the full
available panels for the U.K. and Germany to make the results more comparable with the other
countries and to reduce the movement away from stationarity as additional years are added.
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a 1% was needed for France and Germany. However, a 2% lower trim level was
needed for the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. Even though the levels vary across
the countries, our inequality measure is relatively indiﬀerent to the length of the
upper and lower tails and thus the results are insensitive to variation in the trim
levels around these values.
Our samples are constructed to be similar across the countries with a few
exceptions to capture institutional diﬀerences. For example, our sample is re-
stricted to individuals between the ages of 16 and 65 for the U.S., U.K. and
Canada and ages 16 to 60 for France and Germany with the latter reﬂecting an
earlier retirement age in those countries. Another diﬀerence is in the education
categories reﬂecting the diﬀerent structures of the educational systems and the
diﬀerent responses collected in the data sets. For the U.S., Canada and France
there are four education categories that correspond to less than high school, high
school, some college, and university. For the U.K. the categories are less than
high school, high school graduate and more than high school, while for Germany
the categories are based on a years of education measure grouped as follows: no
more than 10 years, more than 10 but less than 14 years, 14 or more years.
3.2 Stationarity of the Earnings Distribution
In Table 1 we present the stationary equilibrium distributions that stem from
our predicted transition probabilities.10 If our methodology isolates only posi-
tional mobility, the earnings decile elements within each column should be the
same and equal to 1 minus the predicted unemployment rate divided by 10. By
construction in the data the elements are the same and equal to 1 minus the
actual unemployment rate divided by 10. For most countries and for both men
and women, the equilibrium distributions obtained from the homogeneous model
10To compute equilibrium distributions, we ﬁrst average the transition probability matrix P
across individual characteristics. The equilibrium distribution is then the eigenvector associated
with the ﬁrst eigenvalue of the transpose of P . In the cases where the destination deciles are
collapsed, we divide the predicted probabilities for entering the combined destination evenly
across the deciles contained in that destination state.
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show a somewhat uneven spread across the deciles. In the U.S. there is only a
slight accumulation in the middle deciles. However, in the U.K. and Canada there
is a marked accumulation in the top deciles; in France in the bottom deciles; and
in Germany in both tails. Allowing for ﬁxed eﬀects results in a marked improve-
ment for the U.K., Canada and Germany. In the case of France, allowing for ﬁxed
eﬀects now induces an accumulation in the middle deciles. Likely three years are
not enough for a precise estimation of the ﬁxed eﬀects. Overall the results suggest
that our method for removing the structural changes is successful.
Table 1 also shows the predicted stationary unemployment rate as well as the
actual unemployment rate in the data used for the transition analysis. Since we
use multiple periods to estimate the transition matrix, we mitigate the problem
of cyclical variation in unemployment rates to some extent. Because our model
matches the average unemployment rate over several years, it is not unduly in-
ﬂuenced by any one year. This is important when conducting cross-country com-
parisons as not all countries may be at the same stage of the business cycle during
the base-year. While the results in Table 1 show the model does well at capturing
the relative magnitudes of the unemployment rates across the countries, there is
a general tendency for the predicted unemployment rates to be lower than the
actual unemployment rates. The exception to this ﬁnding is France. Closer in-
spection of the unemployment rates in the data by year shows that for all of the
countries, except France, the male and female unemployment rates fall over the
sample period. Thus, the inﬂow (outﬂow) rates are decreasing (increasing) over
time. Since the predicted rates are calculated from these ﬂow rates, this leads
to estimated stationary rates that are lower than the actual rates. This eﬀect is
more pronounced for those countries with the largest decline in the unemploy-
ment rate: males in the U.K. and males and females in Germany and Canada.
These are also the countries where we use more years of data and thus can expect
to face more challenges related to stationarity.
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3.3 Cross-Section Distribution of Earnings
In terms of ﬁt, the proposed regression framework does a good job of capturing
the features of the earnings data. Table 2 shows the actual and predicted mo-
ments of the earnings distributions for each country for males and females for
the speciﬁcations without and with unobserved heterogeneity. The model pro-
duces a good ﬁt for the mean and standard deviation. The skewness and kurtosis
predictions are not quite as good but in most cases the ﬁt is reasonable given
that these moments are not functions of the explanatory variables. While both
model speciﬁcations match the mean and variance, the ﬁxed eﬀect model ﬁts the
skewness and kurtosis levels better.
3.4 Transitions
In order to examine the performance of our earnings dynamics speciﬁcation, we
compute Spearman's rank correlation using pairs of years from the actual and
predicted log earnings data for each country. Spearman's rank correlation is
calculated by using ranks instead of levels as in the more common Pearson's cor-
relation calculation. We examine rank rather than level correlations because we
are interested in movements within the distribution, not level changes. Further,
in the simulation exercise the marginal distribution is ﬁxed and mobility results
entirely from rank dynamics. Using the multinomial logit model samples, we
compute two rank correlations.11 The ﬁrst one captures the rank correlation in
the observed data by computing the correlation between the ranks of actual log
earnings in adjacent periods. The second one captures the predicted rank cor-
relations from the model by computing the correlation between ranks for actual
log earnings in the ﬁrst period and the ranks for predicted log earnings from our
model in the second period. We examine the rank correlations of the earnings
11Because we examine rank correlations in the earnings data only respondents who are working
in both periods enter into the calculations for the actual correlations, and only respondents who
are working in the ﬁrst period and predicted to be working in the latter period enter into the
calculations for the predicted correlations.
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data rather than the residuals even though our mobility model is estimated only
on the residuals. Thus a comparison of the actual and predicted rank correla-
tions eﬀectively captures how well the full model reproduces the observed earnings
mobility.
Table 3 presents the rank correlations conditional on the earnings decile in the
ﬁrst period. To calculate these correlations we start by dividing the ﬁrst period
earnings data into deciles and within each decline assign ranks. Next, we assign
ranks to the second period earnings data associated with the ﬁrst period earnings
in each decile. The second period earnings may or may not fall in the same
decile. Finally, we compute the Spearman's correlation between the two ranks
for each ﬁrst period decile. We do this calculation twice: once using the actual
second period earnings and once using the predicted second period earnings. By
subdividing the earnings data in this way we are better able to determine the
performance of the model in diﬀerent parts of the distribution rather than just
overall. Both speciﬁcations produce a good ﬁt to the data in the middle deciles;
for most countries the speciﬁcation with unobserved heterogeneity produces a
slightly better ﬁt in the extreme deciles.
Several features of the data stand out in this table: 1) the U.S. exhibits much
lower correlations than any of the other countries, 2) the correlations are larger
at the extreme deciles of the distributions than in the middle, 3) the correlations
are larger for the top than the bottom, and 4) the correlations for males and
females within each country are quite similar. The second and third conclusions
are important as they justify our more ﬂexible approach to earnings dynamics. In
particular, a single correlation parameter does not permit a full characterization
of the earnings autocorrelations throughout the entire distribution.
3.5 Long-run Dynamics
Given the ﬂexibility of our model speciﬁcation, it is not surprising that the model
can return the main features of the estimation samples. For a model of lifetime
earnings the true test is long-run dynamics. To measure the performance of
our model over a longer period we compute Spearman's rank correlation using
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the ranks at all possible orders. That is, for each 2-year, 3-year, 4-year, etc. pair
observed in the data we compute the rank correlations between the actual earnings
levels in the two years and the rank correlation between the actual earnings in the
initial year and the earnings level predicted 2, 3, and 4 years later, respectively.
Table 4 displays the Spearman rank correlations at all possible orders for each
country.
The model with no ﬁxed eﬀect fails to ﬁt the long-run dynamics predicting too
much mobility over time resulting in correlations that decrease much faster than
those in the data. For example, in the U.S. the correlation in the data falls from
0.76 for 1-year diﬀerences to 0.66 for 3-year diﬀerences, while the model predicts
a much lower correlation of 0.49 for 3-year diﬀerences. This pattern is found for
both males and females in all of the countries. In comparison the ﬁxed eﬀect
model does a much better job, although it predicts more persistence in earnings
over time than there is in the data. In fact the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation produces
very little decrease in the correlation suggesting that the ﬁxed eﬀects essentially
maintain individuals' ranks within the distribution. Given these two speciﬁca-
tions produce results that encompass the observed correlations, the amount of
equalization mobility in each country lies between them.
The ﬁgures in Table 4 support the previous ﬁnding that the U.S. exhibits more
positional mobility than the other countries with no other country coming close
to its low correlations. The U.K. exhibits the second highest mobility levels, while
Canada and Germany appear, perhaps surprisingly, to be quite similar. Finally,
France is the most immobile country with the highest 1-year correlations and
no apparent drop in 2-year correlations. Interestingly males and females exhibit
the same correlation patterns despite diﬀerences in the earnings distributions
themselves.
The full sample correlations in Table 4 are higher than the conditional corre-
lations in Table 3. In the limit, if individuals remained in the same decile for ever,
the Spearman rank correlation across deciles would be close to one. However, one
could still have a very low correlation within deciles. This is not what we ﬁnd.
This is reassuring as it indicates there is nothing special about using deciles. If
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we used a ﬁner discretization, the result would likely be the same.
4 Lifetime Inequality
Having demonstrated that our empirical speciﬁcation provides a good ﬁt of the
observed data, we now turn to the calculation of lifetime inequality. Since we do
not have income values while unemployed for our base sample, we use only those
employed in the base-year in our calculations of current and lifetime inequality.
In this way we have comparable samples across all of our calculations.
4.1 Gender, Education and Experience Eﬀects
To see how lifetime annuity values diﬀer from earnings Table 5 presents ratios of
average earnings and values for education and experience groups by gender. The
gender ratio is the female average divided by the male average. The education
ratio is the average of the highest education group divided by the average of the
lowest. Likewise the experience ratio is the average of those with 25+ years of
experience divided by the average of those with less than 15 years of experience.
Focusing ﬁrst on gender, we ﬁnd the gender ratio is substantially less than
one in all countries. This is due to the inclusion of part-time workers which are
predominantly women. The gender ratio is also similar across the two measures
indicating mobility does not alleviate nor exacerbate gender diﬀerences. With
regard to education and experience, the education premiums increase when com-
paring earnings ratios to lifetime annuity value ratios. In contrast, the experience
premiums decrease. Thus mobility reinforces education diﬀerences and eliminates
diﬀerences across experience groups. The latter is because low experience levels
incorporate future growth in earnings in the lifetime annuity value, while higher
experience levels incorporate ﬂat to declining future earnings proﬁles. In terms
of inequality, these ﬁndings indicate that educational diﬀerences tend to enhance
long-run inequality, while diﬀerences in experience levels tend to reduce it.
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4.2 Equalization Mobility
We now turn our attention to a comparison of current and lifetime earnings
inequality. Table 6 shows inequality levels for base-year earnings (1998) and
lifetime annuity values using 90-10 ratios for males and females in each country.12
The top panel shows the results for the model with no unobserved heterogeneity,
while the bottom panel shows the results for the ﬁxed eﬀect model. Within each
panel row 1 contains the 90/10 ratios for base-year earnings, while row 6 contains
the 90/10 ratios for our calculated lifetime annuity values using the full model
including both earnings mobility and employment risk (labeled full mobility).13
Following Fields (2009) the amount of equalization mobility is measured by the
ratio of the lifetime inequality measure to the base-year inequality measure and
is given in row 8. In between rows 1 and 6, these panels display counterfactual
exercises analyzed below.
Starting with earnings inequality and comparing across countries (row 1),
we ﬁnd that for males the U.S. exhibits the highest level of base-year earnings
inequality. Canada and the U.K. exhibit similar levels that are between the U.S.
and France and Germany where the latter have the lowest levels. For females,
the U.S. has again the highest level. However, the U.K. is now closer to the U.S.;
Canada remains in the middle; and France and Germany remain at the bottom.
Turning to lifetime annuity values (row 6), the levels of lifetime inequality
are in general lower than the level of earnings inequality. As expected the U.S.
12Results using other inequality measures such as the Gini coeﬃcient are similar and available
upon request.
13To compute these calculations we use the 1998 sample only. Because the sample sizes for a
single year are relatively small for the U.K., Germany and France, the inequality measures can
vary across simulations. Thus we implement the following Monte Carlo: after n iterations of the
counterfactual simulations let x(n) be the mean of the n statistics of interest (e.g. 90/10 ratio);
stop if |x(n)− x(n− 1)| is less than 1% of x(n− 1). The standard deviation of these means for
the full mobility speciﬁcations are in row 7. We note that females exhibit more variation than
males and Germany with the smallest sample size exhibits the most variation.
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exhibits the largest diﬀerential between current and lifetime inequality levels (row
8). After the U.S. is Canada and then the U.K. Germany and France have the
lowest levels of equalization. Comparing the models with and without ﬁxed ef-
fects, the amount of equalization is much smaller in the ﬁxed eﬀect model. Instead
of a reduction of inequality of about 30%40%, in the case of the U.S., Canada
and the U.K., the reduction is only 10%15% in the ﬁxed eﬀect model.
4.3 Counterfactual Analyses
To determine the relative importance of diﬀerent forms of mobility we simulate
the lifetime annuity values under various scenarios.
4.3.1 Earnings Mobility Only
We ﬁrst isolate the eﬀects of positional earnings mobility by excluding transitions
across employment and unemployment.14 We examine the level of long-run in-
equality that results if we allow for only upward earnings mobility, only downward
earnings mobility and both.15 As expected, positional mobility has an equalizing
eﬀect. Interestingly upward earnings mobility results in more equalization than
downward earnings mobility except for French males in the homogeneous model.
This result underscores the need for a ﬂexible transition model that does not
impose symmetry restrictions on up and down movements within the earnings
distribution.
While including positional earnings mobility always results in less inequality,
the amount varies by country. In general the U.S., Canada and the U.K. see larger
reductions than France or Germany. For men, however, the larger reductions for
the former countries do not change the fact that they still have higher inequality
levels than the latter countries. For women several reversals occur. In the homo-
14Here we set the probability of exiting to unemployment to zero and transfer that probability
to remaining in the current state.
15For the case of only upward (downward) mobility we set the probability of transiting to
lower (higher) deciles to zero and transfer that probability to remaining in the current state.
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geneous model the U.K. now exhibits the highest level of inequality, followed by
Germany and then the U.S. In the ﬁxed eﬀect model Germany remains the lowest
reversing with France, while the U.S. and the U.K. exchange orderings. Thus,
the countries in our study become more similar once positional earnings mobility
is taken into consideration.
4.3.2 Employment Risk Only
The inclusion of employment risk only, however, shows a diﬀerent pattern. When
we allow for mobility only between employment and unemployment,16 we ﬁnd
the equalization eﬀect is much lower and in some cases employment risk increases
inequality in the long-run.17 This is especially true for countries such as France
and Germany that have a very low exit rate out of unemployment.18 Thus, in
the long-run, earnings mobility is equalizing, but employment risk is not. This
explains why France and Germany exhibit such a limited long-run reduction of
inequality. Clearly ignoring employment risk would result in the incorrect con-
clusion that France and Germany had equalization rates similar to the other
countries and therefore substantially lower levels of lifetime inequality.
16Here we set the probability of changing earnings deciles to zero and transfer that probability
to remaining in the current decile.
17The income received during unemployment is not included in the earnings regression used
to calculate the residuals used in the positional earnings mobility process estimation. Since the
income assigned to unemployment is a fraction of earnings, the lowest values lie outside the
lower bound of the earnings distribution. Thus the inclusion of employment risk adds income
values that lower the lifetime annuity values, on average, and in particular those at the low end
of the earnings distribution where the risk of unemployment is high. This can result in a higher
lifetime inequality levels than the base-year level within our chosen sample of employed workers.
If the full sample (employed and unemployed workers) is used, then lifetime inequality is lower
than base-year inequality in all countries, but the reduction is still much smaller in France and
Germany such that equalization across countries remains.
18For example, the exit rate out of unemployment is 0.27 for France compared to 0.75 for the
U.S.
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The ﬁnding that employment risk is an important component of lifetime in-
equality is supported by Altonji et al. (2007) and Pavan (2008) who ﬁnd links
between employment risk and earnings. Our full mobility results are also in
agreement with studies that use search models to incorporate employment risk
and earnings mobility through job changes such as Flinn (2002) and Cohen (1999).
In particular, the homogeneous version of our model produces the result that life-
time inequality levels are similar across the countries despite diﬀerent base-year
inequality levels. The similarity in the ﬁndings is likely related to the search
studies incorporating employment risk but not unobserved heterogeneity.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Because the employment risk calculations rely on our assumptions regarding un-
employment income, we conduct sensitivity analysis with regard to these as-
sumptions. Table 7 displays the results of counterfactual simulations under three
diﬀerent scenarios and compares them to our original (base) model. In the ﬁrst
case we replace the ﬁrst-year gross replacement rate with a ﬁve-year average of
the gross rates in each country and no longer lower unemployment income after
the ﬁrst year. 19 The ﬁve-year averages are lower than the ﬁrst-year rate because
they take into account that countries reduce the replacement rate over time. The
reduction is smaller for European countries due to longer durations of unemploy-
ment insurance. The ﬁve-year averages also take into account the variation in
rates across demographic groups as the rates are weighted by the population in
each group when taking the average. In the second case we use a ﬁve-year av-
erage of net replacement rates. In our base model we use the gross replacement
rate because we use gross earnings as our income measure. Net replacement rates
can be substantially higher than gross replacement rates because they take into
account other forms of subsidies to unemployed workers. Net replacement rates
19All of the rates for this sensitivity analysis are taken from Martin (1996). The 5-year average
gross (net) rates are 12% (16%) for the U.S., 18% (51%) for the U.K., 27% (43%) for Canada,
38% (55%) for France and 26% (54%) for Germany.
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also vary more across demographic groups than gross rates and so these averages
reﬂect those diﬀerences as well. The third case assumes the replacement income
level during unemployment is 0.
Table 7 shows that in countries such as the U.S., the U.K. and Canada where
employment risk is minimal the results are basically unchanged. However, for
France and Germany the lifetime inequality levels change quite a bit across the
diﬀerent cases. For these countries using ﬁve-year average rates, especially average
net replacement rates, lowers the amount of lifetime inequality in France and
Germany for both males and females, while setting unemployment income to 0
increases lifetime inequality substantially. The former result stems from longer
unemployment durations in France and Germany and the fact that in the average
speciﬁcations we do not lower unemployment income over time. The latter result
also stems from the fact that unemployment durations are longer in continental
Europe, but now with a 0 value for unemployment income lifetime income values
are lowered substantially by long unemployment spells. This in turn increases
inequality by lowering values at the bottom of the distribution.
As an additional sensitivity test of our results we also used a utility based
approach to see if risk aversion made a diﬀerence. Using a CRRA utility function
speciﬁcation with an intertemporal substitution elasticity of 2, Table 8 shows that
in general the base-year inequality levels for the utility based approach are much
lower than those for the income based approach. The reduction in inequality due
to moving to lifetime measures is also smaller. All of the other orderings and
conclusions remain the same. The lack of a qualitative eﬀect of introducing risk
aversion is likely because we did not model its eﬀect on consumption and savings
with incomplete asset markets. Modeling lifetime consumption inequality has
been attempted (see Cutler and Katz 1992; Attanasio and Davis 1996; Blundell
and Preston 1998; Attanasio et al. 2002) but is severely limited by the lack of
consumer panels.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we compare earnings inequality and mobility across the U.S., Canada,
France, Germany and the U.K. at the turn of the 21st century. We are interested
in the degree to which positional earnings mobility and employment risk in each
country reduces lifetime inequality compared to base-year earnings inequality.
For positional mobility we construct and estimate a ﬂexible model of individual
earnings dynamics for each country that removes structural mobility in order to
isolate mobility within a stable earnings distribution. We then simulate individual
employment and earnings trajectories given base-year earnings (1998) and con-
struct lifetime annuity value distributions for each country. The ratio of lifetime
inequality to base-year inequality is our measure of equalization mobility which
we compare across the countries.
To facilitate cross-country comparisons we designed our model to be estimated
on panels of relatively short lengths. Despite its simplicity and limited data
requirements our model provides a good ﬁt to the earnings and mobility data.
Therefore, we conclude short panel data do not forbid measuring the equalizing
force of mobility. What it important is the ability to simulate ex post realizations
of income over a longer period than that observed in the data.
In our analysis we compare two diﬀerent models: one which does not allow
for unobserved heterogeneity and a simple ﬁxed eﬀect model. The homogeneous
model predicts too much mobility over time, while the ﬁxed eﬀect model pre-
dicts too little mobility. However, the ﬁt of higher-order rank autocorrelations is
much better for the latter model. Thus, two models as deliver upper and lower
benchmarks for the measurement of the degree of equalization.
Given our results, we speculate that mobility reduced earnings inequality over
a lifetime by about 20%30% in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. and very little, if
at all, in France and Germany in the late 1990s. Within our sample of countries,
the countries with relatively higher earnings inequality also have more equal-
izing mobility. Thus, incorporating mobility reveals that countries with North
American-style labour markets are more similar to countries with Continental
European-style labour markets in terms of long-run inequality than measures of
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short-run inequality would suggest. This result can be understood within the
context of search-matching models. In these models higher employment pro-
tection and ﬁring costs lengthen employment spells but also tend to reduce job
creation, as ﬁrms are wary of expanding if they cannot accommodate negative
productivity shocks. Fewer vacancies relative to total search intensity in turn
weakens between-ﬁrm competition for workers, which reduces oﬀer arrival rates,
employment and earnings mobility, and earnings dispersion.
Whether mobility is good or bad is a matter of interpretation. On the one
hand, more earnings and employment mobility moves individual positions more
in the U.S. than elsewhere, so that the U.S. is not such an unequal country af-
ter all. On the other hand, income uncertainty should be negatively valued by
risk-averse individuals. Our attempt to introduce risk aversion did not change
the results. However, our welfare computations in the presence of risk aversion
are not satisfactory, because insurance markets are likely incomplete. More in-
come risk probably means more credit constraints highlighting the limits of the
present exercise. A more satisfactory welfare computation allowing for liquidity
constraints would require consumption data. The few available studies on con-
sumer welfare seem to indicate there is less consumption inequality than income
inequality, and possibly fewer cross-country diﬀerences. Given the similarity of
our ﬁndings to the consumption literature, we think our study goes a long way
toward an assessment of cross-country welfare diﬀerences.
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MALES FEMALES
U.S. Can. U.K. Fra. Ger. U.S. Can. U.K. Fra. Ger.
Homogeneous Model
UNEMPLOYMENT
Predicted 0.023 0.051 0.045 0.139 0.078 0.020 0.047 0.025 0.161 0.098
Actual 0.033 0.072 0.069 0.137 0.094 0.031 0.077 0.037 0.169 0.140
EARNINGS DECILES
1 0.089 0.085 0.097 0.117 0.119 0.081 0.076 0.056 0.104 0.097
2 0.098 0.097 0.096 0.117 0.094 0.093 0.082 0.065 0.103 0.089
3 0.102 0.087 0.088 0.107 0.080 0.099 0.078 0.073 0.101 0.075
4 0.100 0.081 0.081 0.097 0.074 0.102 0.083 0.076 0.088 0.075
5 0.100 0.082 0.080 0.088 0.070 0.102 0.087 0.077 0.094 0.068
6 0.100 0.080 0.082 0.077 0.072 0.102 0.088 0.090 0.086 0.073
7 0.098 0.085 0.088 0.066 0.075 0.103 0.093 0.102 0.079 0.072
8 0.098 0.096 0.101 0.066 0.091 0.099 0.107 0.121 0.070 0.089
9 0.098 0.114 0.112 0.063 0.106 0.100 0.120 0.144 0.059 0.11
10 0.091 0.143 0.130 0.065 0.141 0.098 0.140 0.172 0.056 0.152
Actual 0.097 0.093 0.093 0.086 0.091 0.097 0.092 0.096 0.083 0.086
Fixed Eﬀect Model
UNEMPLOYMENT
Predicted 0.024 0.055 0.045 0.142 0.071 0.021 0.052 0.027 0.171 0.102
Actual 0.033 0.072 0.069 0.137 0.094 0.031 0.077 0.037 0.169 0.140
EARNINGS DECILES
1 0.086 0.085 0.087 0.066 0.085 0.084 0.075 0.078 0.066 0.085
2 0.093 0.094 0.090 0.078 0.085 0.096 0.096 0.086 0.081 0.085
3 0.101 0.097 0.083 0.104 0.087 0.101 0.097 0.094 0.093 0.077
4 0.101 0.104 0.101 0.106 0.102 0.104 0.111 0.103 0.107 0.092
5 0.095 0.109 0.103 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.106 0.109 0.103 0.094
6 0.110 0.110 0.105 0.110 0.095 0.104 0.117 0.113 0.099 0.105
7 0.102 0.091 0.098 0.100 0.091 0.105 0.091 0.100 0.093 0.094
8 0.103 0.081 0.094 0.070 0.090 0.101 0.081 0.095 0.070 0.087
9 0.097 0.084 0.094 0.067 0.098 0.099 0.084 0.097 0.061 0.088
10 0.089 0.090 0.089 0.058 0.094 0.087 0.088 0.098 0.056 0.090
Actual 0.097 0.092 0.093 0.086 0.091 0.097 0.092 0.096 0.083 0.086
Table 1: Comparisons of Predicted Stationary Distributions of Unemployment
and Earnings to Actual Distributions
31
M
A
L
E
S
F
E
M
A
L
E
S
U
.S
.
C
an
ad
a
U
.K
.
F
ra
n
ce
G
er
m
an
y
U
.S
.
C
an
ad
a
U
.K
.
F
ra
n
ce
G
er
m
an
y
H
O
M
O
G
E
N
E
O
U
S
M
O
D
E
L
M
ea
n
A
ct
u
al
28
,1
79
36
,2
34
15
,5
94
14
,8
56
27
,6
11
19
,7
71
23
,4
01
9,
28
8
11
,2
63
16
,8
86
P
re
d
ic
te
d
28
,3
25
36
,2
66
15
,6
57
14
,9
26
27
,5
78
19
,9
36
23
,4
68
9,
31
2
11
,3
64
17
,0
75
S
t
d
ev
A
ct
u
al
18
,3
17
18
,3
88
7,
71
8
6,
72
4
10
,5
50
12
,7
91
12
,2
66
5,
51
5
5,
24
6
7,
81
2
P
re
d
ic
te
d
19
,3
71
20
,3
59
7,
64
4
6,
90
4
10
,8
65
13
,8
78
13
,3
68
6,
00
0
5,
71
6
9,
14
2
S
ke
w
n
es
s
A
ct
u
al
2.
24
1.
07
1.
74
2.
20
1.
05
1.
66
0.
78
1.
16
1.
23
0.
39
P
re
d
ic
te
d
2.
41
1.
47
1.
53
2.
61
1.
02
1.
21
1.
20
1.
63
1.
50
0.
92
K
u
rt
os
is
A
ct
u
al
15
.7
2
5.
36
8.
47
10
.9
0
4.
37
7.
57
3.
52
4.
75
6.
62
3.
03
P
re
d
ic
te
d
15
.1
4
6.
28
6.
80
15
.6
2
5.
10
9.
16
4.
51
6.
57
6.
97
3.
37
F
IX
E
D
E
F
F
E
C
T
M
O
D
E
L
M
ea
n
A
ct
u
al
28
,1
79
36
,2
34
15
,5
94
14
,8
56
27
,6
11
19
,7
71
23
,4
01
9,
28
8
11
,2
63
16
,8
64
P
re
d
ic
te
d
28
,2
65
36
,2
84
15
,5
97
14
,8
60
27
,6
00
19
,8
68
23
,4
95
9,
30
3
11
,3
03
16
,9
95
S
t
d
ev
A
ct
u
al
18
,3
17
18
,3
88
7,
71
8
6,
72
4
10
,5
50
12
,7
91
12
,2
66
5,
51
5
5,
24
6
7,
80
8
P
re
d
ic
te
d
18
,6
42
18
,7
99
7,
66
2
6,
73
7
10
,7
14
13
,2
57
12
,7
49
5,
70
9
5,
35
25
8,
17
2
S
ke
w
n
es
s
A
ct
u
al
2.
24
1.
07
1.
74
2.
20
1.
05
1.
66
0.
78
1.
16
1.
23
0.
38
P
re
d
ic
te
d
2.
06
1.
09
1.
62
2.
20
1.
08
1.
74
0.
94
1.
32
1.
28
0.
55
K
u
rt
os
is
A
ct
u
al
15
.7
2
5.
36
8.
47
10
.9
0
4.
37
7.
57
3.
52
4.
75
6.
62
3.
03
P
re
d
ic
te
d
11
.2
8
5.
09
7.
50
10
.8
0
4.
31
7.
86
3.
92
5.
12
6.
91
3.
12
T
ab
le
2:
A
ct
u
al
an
d
P
re
d
ic
te
d
M
om
en
ts
fr
om
th
e
E
ar
n
in
gs
S
am
p
le
s
fo
r
B
ot
h
M
o
d
el
s
32
M
A
L
E
S
F
E
M
A
L
E
S
U
.S
.
C
an
ad
a
U
.K
.
F
ra
n
ce
G
er
m
an
y
U
.S
.
C
an
ad
a
U
.K
.
F
ra
n
ce
G
er
m
an
y
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.1
3
0
.4
8
0
.4
0
0
.5
2
0
.4
1
0
.1
7
0
.4
2
0
.4
7
0
.5
1
0
.6
5
D
ec
il
e
1
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
15
0.
38
0.
32
0.
46
0.
42
0.
16
0.
32
0.
41
0.
43
0.
61
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
19
0.
53
0.
47
0.
59
0.
44
0.
23
0.
46
0.
46
0.
52
0.
67
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.1
6
0
.3
9
0
.2
5
0
.3
9
0
.2
8
0
.1
7
0
.3
4
0
.2
9
0
.4
7
0
.4
0
D
ec
il
e
2
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
14
0.
37
0.
19
0.
34
0.
29
0.
17
0.
28
0.
30
0.
45
0.
39
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
18
0.
42
0.
26
0.
37
0.
25
0.
19
0.
38
0.
34
0.
45
0.
44
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.1
6
0
.3
8
0
.2
2
0
.2
7
0
.3
0
0
.1
5
0
.3
3
0
.3
4
0
.3
9
0
.4
1
D
ec
il
e
3
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
16
0.
35
0.
18
0.
27
0.
25
0.
15
0.
27
0.
27
0.
37
0.
35
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
14
0.
37
0.
21
0.
29
0.
29
0.
16
0.
33
0.
34
0.
41
0.
45
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.1
5
0
.3
4
0
.1
8
0
.2
9
0
.1
5
0
.1
8
0
.2
9
0
.2
2
0
.2
7
0
.3
8
D
ec
il
e
4
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
15
0.
28
0.
20
0.
29
0.
20
0.
16
0.
26
0.
25
0.
35
0.
34
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
16
0.
33
0.
21
0.
31
0.
19
0.
20
0.
28
0.
26
0.
30
0.
33
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.1
3
0
.3
4
0
.1
8
0
.2
6
0
.2
5
0
.1
4
0
.3
3
0
.2
5
0
.4
6
0
.3
4
D
ec
il
e
5
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
10
0.
29
0.
22
0.
26
0.
18
0.
15
0.
32
0.
24
0.
38
0.
29
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
11
0.
30
0.
21
0.
29
0.
22
0.
11
0.
32
0.
26
0.
40
0.
28
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.1
4
0
.3
5
0
.2
3
0
.3
3
0
.2
6
0
.1
5
0
.3
0
0
.2
0
0
.4
5
0
.3
0
D
ec
il
e
6
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
09
0.
29
0.
20
0.
29
0.
23
0.
13
0.
30
0.
28
0.
34
0.
30
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
13
0.
32
0.
20
0.
32
0.
24
0.
14
0.
30
0.
24
0.
39
0.
25
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.1
8
0
.3
6
0
.2
8
0
.4
8
0
.3
0
0
.1
6
0
.3
3
0
.2
2
0
.4
3
0
.2
9
D
ec
il
e
7
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
16
0.
29
0.
22
0.
42
0.
21
0.
16
0.
28
0.
22
0.
33
0.
24
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
15
0.
33
0.
26
0.
47
0.
29
0.
16
0.
29
0.
22
0.
38
0.
29
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.1
8
0
.3
5
0
.3
0
0
.4
0
0
.3
2
0
.2
2
0
.3
8
0
.3
5
0
.5
3
0
.4
4
D
ec
il
e
8
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
16
0.
29
0.
29
0.
42
0.
30
0.
17
0.
35
0.
29
0.
39
0.
34
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
17
0.
34
0.
29
0.
45
0.
33
0.
17
0.
33
0.
33
0.
48
0.
38
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.2
3
0
.4
1
0
.4
2
0
.5
9
0
.4
3
0
.2
3
0
.4
6
0
.4
5
0
.5
2
0
.5
6
D
ec
il
e
9
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
20
0.
34
0.
39
0.
50
0.
40
0.
21
0.
43
0.
40
0.
45
0.
50
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
23
0.
41
0.
40
0.
59
0.
40
0.
22
0.
46
0.
39
0.
49
0.
44
A
c
tu
a
l
0
.4
3
0
.6
8
0
.6
5
0
.8
1
0
.7
1
0
.4
2
0
.7
2
0
.7
2
0
.8
2
0
.6
2
D
ec
il
e
10
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
40
0.
61
0.
61
0.
76
0.
63
0.
35
0.
69
0.
63
0.
75
0.
56
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
42
0.
66
0.
63
0.
82
0.
72
0.
38
0.
68
0.
65
0.
81
0.
61
T
ab
le
3:
M
o
d
el
F
it
of
E
ar
n
in
gs
M
ob
il
it
y
as
M
ea
su
re
d
b
y
S
p
ea
rm
an
's
R
an
k
C
or
re
la
ti
on
s
b
et
w
ee
n
P
er
io
d
1
E
ar
n
in
gs
an
d
P
er
io
d
2
E
ar
n
in
gs
C
on
d
it
io
n
al
on
P
er
io
d
1'
s
E
ar
n
in
gs
D
ec
il
e
33
M
A
L
E
S
F
E
M
A
L
E
S
U
.S
.
C
an
ad
a
U
.K
.
F
ra
n
ce
G
er
m
an
y
U
.S
.
C
an
ad
a
U
.K
.
F
ra
n
ce
G
er
m
an
y
A
ct
u
al
0
.7
6
0
.9
2
0
.8
8
0
.9
4
0
.9
1
0
.7
7
0
.9
0
0
.9
0
0
.9
4
0
.9
3
1
Y
ea
r
D
iﬀ
er
en
ce
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
76
0.
91
0.
86
0.
93
0.
89
0.
76
0.
89
0.
89
0.
93
0.
91
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
76
0.
92
0.
88
0.
94
0.
90
0.
77
0.
90
0.
90
0.
95
0.
92
A
ct
u
al
0
.7
1
0
.8
7
0
.8
3
0
.9
2
0
.8
7
0
.7
2
0
.8
5
0
.8
6
0
.9
2
0
.8
8
2
Y
ea
r
D
iﬀ
er
en
ce
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
60
0.
81
0.
75
0.
86
0.
79
0.
60
0.
79
0.
80
0.
87
0.
83
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
82
0.
91
0.
87
0.
96
0.
89
0.
82
0.
90
0.
88
0.
96
0.
90
A
ct
u
al
0
.6
6
0
.8
4
0
.7
9
0
.8
5
0
.6
8
0
.8
2
0
.8
2
0
.8
5
3
Y
ea
r
D
iﬀ
er
en
ce
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
49
0.
73
0.
66
0.
72
0.
49
0.
68
0.
71
0.
77
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
77
0.
90
0.
86
0.
89
0.
78
0.
89
0.
88
0.
90
A
ct
u
al
0
.8
1
0
.7
5
0
.8
1
0
.7
9
0
.7
9
0
.8
1
4
Y
ea
r
D
iﬀ
er
en
ce
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
66
0.
58
0.
65
0.
63
0.
64
0.
70
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
89
0.
85
0.
88
0.
88
0.
87
0.
89
A
ct
u
al
0
.8
1
0
.7
5
0
.8
0
0
.7
9
0
.7
9
0
.7
8
5
Y
ea
r
D
iﬀ
er
en
ce
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
58
0.
52
0.
59
0.
54
0.
56
0.
64
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
86
0.
83
0.
86
0.
85
0.
86
0.
88
A
ct
u
al
0
.7
0
0
.7
8
0
.7
3
0
.7
1
6
Y
ea
r
D
iﬀ
er
en
ce
H
om
og
en
eo
u
s
0.
48
0.
53
0.
53
0.
58
F
ix
ed
E
ﬀ
ec
t
0.
83
0.
85
0.
86
0.
86
T
ab
le
4:
M
o
d
el
F
it
of
H
ig
h
er
-O
rd
er
E
ar
n
in
gs
M
ob
il
it
y
u
si
n
g
S
p
ea
rm
an
's
R
an
k
C
or
re
la
ti
on
s
ac
ro
ss
1
to
6
Y
ea
rs
34
U.S. Canada U.K. France Germany
MALES and FEMALES
Gender Ratio Current Earnings 0.70 0.65 0.59 0.76 0.61
Ex-post Annuities, Hom. 0.68 0.65 0.58 0.76 0.60
Ex-post Annuities, FE 0.75 0.71 0.59 0.76 0.63
MALES
Education Ratio Current Earnings 2.51 1.74 1.70 2.04 1.88
Ex-post Annuities, Hom. 2.59 1.74 1.79 2.30 2.37
Ex-post Annuities, FE 2.65 1.73 1.70 2.27 2.11
Experience Ratio Current Earnings 1.27 1.29 1.06 1.14 1.32
Ex-post Annuities, Hom. 1.04 1.01 0.89 0.97 1.02
Ex-post Annuities, FE 0.98 0.98 0.90 1.00 1.05
FEMALES
Education Ratio Current Earnings 2.73 2.19 2.07 2.06 1.67
Ex-post Annuities, Hom. 2.86 2.26 2.14 2.53 1.94
Ex-post Annuities, FE 2.72 2.41 2.12 2.19 1.75
Experience Ratio Current Earnings 1.08 1.11 0.81 1.02 0.94
Ex-post Annuities, Hom. 0.92 0.88 0.70 0.91 0.87
Ex-post Annuities, FE 0.89 0.84 0.67 0.93 0.85
Table 5: Ratios of Average Earnings and Lifetime Annuity Values for Employed
Workers in 1998
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